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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
Studying financial arrangements within heterosexual couples provides insights into intra-household family 
processes. In this paper, we consider an aspect of couples’ financial arrangements that has been largely 
overlooked in the literature: bank account choices. Joint bank accounts have symbolic meanings involving 
mutuality, collectivity and trust, whereas separate bank accounts have symbolic meanings of financial 
autonomy. The choice between joint and separate bank accounts also has important substantive 
implications on whether and how different partners within a couple can access money. Individuals who rely 
exclusively on joint accounts, but whose partners have also separate accounts, may find themselves 
particularly disadvantaged. This imbalance can become the root of power differentials within the couple, 
and a potential source of tension and conflict. 
In this paper we examine the patterns, dynamics and predictors of bank account arrangements in 
contemporary Australia, using household panel data stretching from 2002 to 2014. We contribute to the 
existing literature by (i) systematically assessing how economic, life-course, and socio-cultural factors 
determine couples’ bank account choices, using relevant information from both couple members; (ii) 
examining couples’ bank account choices as they evolve over time; and (iii) providing first-time evidence for 
the Australian context that complements the limited international evidence available. 
Heterosexual couples in Australia tend to favour mixed banking strategies; that is, they often hold joint and 
separate bank accounts at the same time. The most prevalent scenario involves the exclusive use of a joint 
bank account, but alternative ‘separate but equal’ models are on the rise. These involve both the male and 
female partners holding separate accounts in addition or instead of a joint account. We also find that, as for 
other countries, couple’s bank account choices in contemporary Australia are reflective of partners’ socio-
demographic characteristics (e.g. age, marital status, employment status, education, and ethnicity). In 
addition, we provide new evidence that such choices are also contingent on other economic, life-course, 
socio-cultural and intergenerational factors. For example, joint bank accounts are associated with 
egalitarian contributions to household income, more dependent children, less complicated relationship 
history, longer relationships, traditional gender ideology, and coming from a traditional family background. 
Conversely, separate bank account arrangements are associated with unequal income contributions to the 
household, fewer dependent children, remarriage/re-partnership, short relationship duration, egalitarian 
gender attitudes, high parental socioeconomic status, and a non-traditional family background.  
Our results indicate that examining the predictors of bank account choices constitutes a novel and 
insightful way to further probe into the gendering of every-day life family processes. Our findings also have 
important implications for gender equality in financial arrangements within Australian couples and on the 
financial emancipation of partnered women. 
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Abstract 
While bank accounts choices provide an important window into within-couple financial 
arrangements, they remain relatively under-researched. In this paper we examine trends in and 
predictors of couples’ bank account choices using contemporary household-panel data for 
Australia. We contribute to the existing literature by systematically assessing the predictive 
power of economic, life-course, socio-cultural, and intergenerational factors; estimating state-
of-the-art panel regression models; using longitudinal information from both couple members; 
and providing first-time evidence for the Australian context. Key findings indicate that a large 
share of couples in Australia favour ‘mixed’ bank account strategies (i.e. holding both joint 
and separate accounts), but ‘egalitarian’ choices (i.e. dual separate accounts) are prevalent and 
on the rise. Couples’ bank account choices are influenced in theoretically-meaningful ways by 
economic resources, transaction costs, relationship history, gender-role attitudes, and family 
background. These results provide an additional window to examining how everyday-life 
family decisions are enacted, and are sometimes rooted within gendered discourses. 
 
Keywords: financial arrangements, bank accounts, households, gender inequality, panel data, 
Australia 
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1 Introduction 
In the past few decades, Western countries have witnessed important changes towards 
more progressive gender ideologies (England, 2010), the emergence of increasingly 
participative economic roles for women (OECD, 2013; United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2010), and substantial diversification in the duration, types 
and outcomes of intimate relationships (Cherlin, 2009; Lesthaege, 2014). All of these are 
factors that have had an impact on the financial circumstances of partnered individuals, 
and the patterns through which these individuals manage their economic assets 
(Cunningham-Burley & Jamieson, 2003). It is therefore unsurprising that academic and 
policy interest in how couples manage their financial resources grew exponentially 
following these unprecedented socio-demographic transformations, with Pahl’s (1983) 
influential conceptual framework as a departure point. 
Women’s financial independence is an important aspect of gender equality within 
heterosexual couples, because it liberates women from fear of obligations to men 
(England, 2010). With the surge of cohabitation and the increasing incidence of 
relationship breakdown, financially dependent women are susceptible to income 
poverty, material deprivation, poor physical and mental health, and marital instability 
(Burgoyne, 1990; Munsch, 2015; Pahl, 1980; Pahl, 1995; Vogler, 1989; Wilson, 1987). 
While women’s labor force participation, occupational standing and earnings in Western 
countries have increased substantially since the mid 20th century, it is unclear whether 
these improvements have translated into egalitarian arrangements concerning the 
management of and control over household financial resources (Morris, 1987; United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009). 
The continuing normativity of historical stereotypes of women as ‘secondary earners’, at 
the macro level (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009; Zelizer, 
1994), and the prevalence of traditional gender-role attitudes among women and their 
partners, at the micro level, have been put forwards as explanations for prevailing gender 
inequality in financial management (Bartley, Blanton & Gilliard, 2005; Kaufman, 2000). 
Despite ideological movements towards gender egalitarianism since the 1960s (Brewster 
& Padavic, 2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004), traditional family models involving a male 
‘breadwinner’ and a female ‘homemaker’ remain popular, particularly at some stages of 
the life course (Hendrickx, Bernasco & de Graaf, 2001; Vogler & Pahl, 1993). This is 
evidenced, among others, by remaining inequalities between men and women in 
housework and childcare responsibilities (Bianchi et al., 2012; Sayer, Bianchi & Robinson, 
2004), and a greater tendency for women to work part-time to ‘juggle’ work and family 
and to forfeit paid employment after childbirth (Budig, 2003). 
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As men remain the main contributors to household income, they often feel entitled to 
control over the household financial resources (Fleming, 1997). This leaves women with 
weak bargaining power and financial vulnerability, and may have important long-term 
consequences on their financial security and wellbeing (Burgoyne, 2004). Hence, 
studying financial arrangements within heterosexual couples provides deep insights into 
intra-household gender equality, and its implications on women’s financial and general 
wellbeing. In this paper, we consider an aspect of gender egalitarianism in couples’ 
financial arrangements that has been largely overlooked: bank account choices, defined 
as the choices made within intimate relationships concerning the number, type (joint vs. 
separate) and holder of couple members’ bank accounts. Bank account choices are an 
important reflection of gender egalitarianism in financial arrangements within couples, 
with distinctions drawn between ‘collectivized’ arrangements (when couples pool 
financial resources in joint bank accounts) and ‘privatized’ arrangements (when couple 
members hold financial resources in separate bank accounts) (Treas, 1993). However, 
despite some pioneer contributions (Cheal, 1993; Kan & Laurie, 2014; Kenney, 2006; Lee 
& Pocock, 2007; Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011; Treas, 1993), we still know relatively 
little about what personal, familial and societal factors are associated with the adoption 
of different bank account arrangements within couples. 
In this paper we use panel data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey and panel regression models to examine the predictors of bank 
account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia. In doing so, we add to the 
existing literature by (i) systematically assessing how intra- and inter-generational 
economic, life-course, and socio-cultural factors jointly determine couples’ bank account 
choices, using relevant information from both couple members; (ii) modelling couples’ 
bank account choices as they evolve over time; and (iii) providing first-time evidence for 
the Australian context that complements the limited international evidence available. Key 
findings indicate that a relatively large share of couples in Australia favor ‘mixed’ bank 
account choices (i.e. holding both joint and separate accounts), but ‘egalitarian’ choices 
(i.e. dual separate accounts) are prevalent and on the rise. Couples’ bank account choices 
are influenced in theoretically-meaningful ways by economic resources, transaction 
costs, relationship history, gender-role attitudes, and family background.  
 
2 Financial arrangements through the lens of bank account choices 
Assessing the ways in which couples arrange their bank accounts opens a window to 
improving our understanding of gender egalitarianism in financial arrangements within 
the household. Joint bank accounts have been argued to have symbolic meanings 
involving mutuality, collectivity and trust, as they signal commitment to the conjugal 
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family (Treas, 1993). From this perspective, joint bank accounts are a symptom of 
egalitarianism concerning how couples manage, control and access money. In contrast, 
separate bank accounts have symbolic meanings of financial autonomy, and the money 
deposited in separate bank accounts is often viewed by partners as ‘their own money’ 
(Vogler, Lyonette & Wiggins, 2008).  
The choice between joint and separate bank accounts has important substantive 
implications. For example, separate bank accounts allow men and women to have 
independent and relatively unsupervised access to money, whereas expenditure of 
money deposited in joint bank accounts may be subject to closer scrutiny by the other 
partner and more overt within-couple negotiations. Given this, individuals who rely 
exclusively on joint accounts, but whose partners have also separate accounts, may find 
themselves particularly disadvantaged. This imbalance can become the root of power 
differentials within the couple, and a potential source of tension and conflict (see Kan & 
Laurie, 2014).  
While bank account choices are an important aspect of financial organization within the 
household, research into the patterns and precursors of within-couple bank account 
arrangements is very limited. This lack of attention likely has its roots in the absence of 
suitable data sources that collect such complex information. Consequently, the majority 
of the literature on within-couple financial arrangements focuses on subjectively defined 
money management (Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al., 2011). For instance, surveys often ask 
respondents which couple member takes the responsibility for managing household 
money, or who has the final say over large expenditure decisions (Vogler, Brockmann & 
Wiggins, 2006). While these measures provide valuable insights, they are not without 
issues or an exhaustive representation of couples’ financial arrangements. One problem 
is that these subjective measures may not reflect actual behaviors, and hence may be 
susceptible to measurement error. For example, respondents may overreport their 
partner’s role in deciding how money is organized or spent, or report more egalitarian 
arrangements than actually take place due to social pressures, resulting in social 
desirability bias (Zaller & Feldman, 1992). Responses between couple members are also 
likely to be inconsistent due to differences in their subjective perceptions of or definitions 
around money management. Information on bank account ownership, on the other hand, 
is an objective measure of financial arrangements, and may be more accurate in capturing 
actual financial practices within couples and a better proxy for financial behavior. 
Altogether, we argue that there is value in paying attention to within-couple bank account 
choices as an alternative and additional aspect of gender-egalitarianism (or lack of it) in 
day-to-day financial practices. 
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3 Predictors of bank account arrangements 
An extensive literature examines intra-household financial organization and money 
management generally, yet only a handful of studies has examined couples’ bank account 
choices more specifically. This includes Treas (1993) and Kenney (2006) for the US, Cheal 
(1993) for Canada, Kan and Laurie (2014) for the UK, Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte (2011) 
for Norway and Lee and Pocock (2007) for South Korea.  Despite some inconsistencies in 
the measurement of bank account choices and the timing of the existing studies, findings 
from this small pool of international studies suggest that couples’ bank account choices 
differ substantially across countries: two thirds of American couples rely exclusively on 
joint bank accounts (Treas, 1993), whereas around 60-80% of UK couples hold separate 
bank accounts (Kan & Laurie, 2014). About 44% of Norwegian couples pool their 
economic resources in joint bank accounts (Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011), while these 
are virtually inexistent among South Korean couples –due to legislative emphasis on 
financial individuality (Lee & Pocock, 2007). Across studies, bank account choices are 
associated with couple members’ absolute and relative income, education, ethnicity, 
employment status, relationship characteristics, and family size (Cheal, 1993; Kan & 
Laurie, 2014; Kenney, 2006; Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011; Treas, 1993). Taking 
together these previous findings, and theory and evidence from the broader literature on 
within-couple financial organization and practices, we derive testable hypotheses about 
how different factors will be related to couples’ bank account choices in our 
contemporary Australian panel data.  
 
Absolute and relative income 
Income is a key predictor of within-couple financial arrangements (Heimdal & 
Houseknecht, 2003; Vogler & Pahl, 1993; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). The effect of income on 
financial arrangements depends on two factors. The first factor is the position of couples’ 
total income in the income distribution. Independent financial arrangements are more 
prevalent among high-income couples (Edwards, 1982; Vogler, Brockmann & Wiggins, 
2006), whereas resource sharing occurs more often in low- and moderate-income 
couples (Bennett & Sung, 2013). This is because resource pooling accomplishes 
economies of scale in household production, whereas high-income couples are able to 
forgo the cost advantages by adopting multiple bank accounts (i.e. separate accounts) in 
pursuit of financial autonomy. 
The second factor is the relative contributions of the male and female partners to couples’ 
total income (i.e. their relative resources). Relative resources and bargaining power  
theories pose that an individual’s power in household decision making is proportional to 
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the amount of resources that she/he contributes to the household vis-à-vis her/his 
partner (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Nyman, 2003; Rogers & Schlossman, 1990). Particularly, 
couples are more likely to pool resources as the male and female income contributions 
approach equality, and more likely to bank separately when women contribute more than 
men to household income (Kenney, 2006; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). This resonates with 
research findings indicating that financial independence is higher in dual-earner couples 
(Fleming, 1997; Pahl, 1989; Vogler, Brockmann & Wiggins, 2006). 
Based on this literature, for bank account choices we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Couples’ total income will be positively associated with the probability of 
holding separate bank accounts.  
Hypothesis 1b: Unequal income contributions to couple household income will lead to 
separate banking strategies, with women’s contributions being more predictive of 
separate bank account choices than men’s contributions. 
 
Children as a transaction cost 
The resources necessary to raise children (e.g. time and effort) are scarce, and so families 
with children operate subject to constraints (Becker, 1981). In this context, families must 
strategically allocate their finite resources to maximize outputs. One way to accomplish 
this is smoothing their daily operations by minimizing everyday-life hassles, constant 
auditing of the spending of the other couple member and persistent negotiations on what 
money needs to be spent on, and why (Treas, 1993). In the context of family finance 
research, the presence of children has been argued to lead to increasing ‘transaction 
costs’, i.e. costs associated with bargaining and monitoring household resource spending 
among couple members (Pollak, 1985). For example, children increase the number of 
payments and daily financial operations within households. To minimize these 
transaction costs, couples with children will be particularly likely to seek efficient 
banking strategies that enable them to maximize personal and household utilities. 
Specifically, having joint bank accounts should reduce time-consuming discussions and 
negotiations about whose account to use to make payments. We therefore hypothesize 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The number of dependent children will be positively associated with the 
likelihood of having a joint bank account. 
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Relationship history and duration 
Relationship history can predict financial organization because, compared to other 
couples, remarried/re-partnered couples (i) are more likely to consider money 
management as a major issue in their relationship (Lown, McFadden & Crossman, 1989), 
(ii) may have gained a certain degree of financial autonomy (Fishman, 1983), and (iii) 
may have more complicated financial situations, e.g. they may retain complex financial 
links with their ex-partners and/or biological children (Burgoyne & Morison, 1997; 
Coleman & Ganong, 1989). Collectively, these suggest that remarried/re-partnered 
couples may have a tendency towards banking separately. Conversely, couples in longer 
relationships may be more likely to bank jointly, because the longevity in their 
relationship is indicative of mutual trust.  
Empirically, evidence suggests that relationship duration is positively associated with the 
likelihood of income pooling (Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011). On the other hand, the 
incidence of separate financial management in remarried couples is much higher than in 
the general population. This constitutes suggestive evidence that resource pooling in new 
families is hampered by unresolved financial problems from previous relationships, the 
desire to protect one’s financial assets in case the new relationship breaks down, or as an 
‘exit’ option from such relationship (Burgoyne & Morison, 1997). Studies also indicate 
that having a previous history of union dissolution predicts bank account choices: couples 
in which at least one partner was divorced or widowed are less likely to use joint bank 
accounts (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003; Treas, 1993). 
Based on the existing theory and evidence, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Remarried/re-partnered couples will be more likely to use separate bank 
accounts than couples in their first marriages/de facto relationships. 
Hypothesis 3b: Relationship duration will be positively associated with the probability of 
resource pooling. 
 
Gender-role attitudes 
The traditional male breadwinner model is still enacted by many couples, given economic 
realities such as the gender pay gap and unaffordable childcare (Burgoyne et al., 2006). 
Since gender attitudes are often predictive of subsequent behavior (Davis & Greenstein, 
2009), these can be considered an important driver of within-couple financial 
arrangements (Roman & Vogler, 1999). The perception that women should prioritize 
homemaking and childrearing justifies men’s assertion of masculinity and domination in 
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household money control and financial decision making, which should in turn preclude 
financial separateness –particularly for women. Consistent with this, traditional gender 
ideology is often associated with joint access to money (Treas & Widmer, 2000) and 
authoritarian control over money by the male partner (Kenney, 2006). In contrast, the 
egalitarian ideology of co-providing emphasizes equal financial wellbeing through 
independent money control and management (Cheal, 1993; Vogler, 1998; Vogler, 
Brockmann & Wiggins, 2006). 
We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Couples in which partners hold traditional gender-role attitudes will be less 
likely to have separate bank accounts than couples in which partners hold egalitarian 
gender-role attitudes.   
 
Intergenerational effects 
The family is a socializing unit through which children learn about their social world. One 
component of this socialization process is the transmission of information, attitudes, 
values, etc. about money and finances from parents to children. Through explicit 
education, information sharing, and day-to-day interactions, parents pass onto their 
children financial attitudes, knowledge and capabilities (Alhabeeb, 1996; Gudmunson & 
Danes, 2011; John, 1999; Moschis, 1985; Wald, 1974). This financial mentality is then 
brought into intimate relationships, and enacted –among others– via bank account 
choices. Family financial socialization theory suggests that individuals’ financial 
perceptions and practices are reflective of parental social class and parental education 
(Cateora, 1963; Gudmunson & Danes, 2011; John, 1999; Wald, 1974). Specifically, high 
parental education and occupational status are associated with positive offspring 
financial behaviors, including prudent saving, rational spending and strategic financial 
planning (Furnham, 1999; Gudmunson & Danes, 2011). Additionally, highly educated 
parents are more likely to set up egalitarian family arrangements concerning finances 
and money management (Conger, Conger & Martin, 2010). Hence, it is possible that their 
adult children also do so through the impact of socialization and role modelling. We thus 
predict that: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Couples in which partners come from high socio-economic family 
backgrounds will be more likely to organise money separately than couples in which 
partners come from low socio-economic family backgrounds.  
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Another strand of intergenerational research on the transmission of financial attitudes 
and practices has focused on the role of gender egalitarian attitudes and practices in the 
parental generation. For example, growing up in a family in which the mother held 
egalitarian gender-role attitudes has a large positive effect on daughters’ gender ideology 
and labor market outcomes, such as the probability of full-time employment and work 
hours (Johnston, Schurer & Shields, 2014). Other research has found similar results for 
maternal engagement in the labor force, earnings and occupational standing (Morrill & 
Morrill, 2013; van Putten, Dykstra & Schipper, 2008). These families can be described as 
‘non-traditional’, in the sense that mothers’ bargaining power is more comparable to 
fathers’. Children raised in such non-traditional families (particularly daughters) are 
likely to emulate these arrangements as adults, which should in turn translate into 
egalitarian financial arrangements by banking separately as they form their own family. 
While research on this is very limited, descriptive analyses reveal substantial 
intergenerational continuity in money management among couples in the UK, whereby 
adult children’s financial management resembles that of the parental generation (Volger 
& Pahl, 1993). Based on this, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Couples in which partners come from non-traditional family backgrounds 
will be more likely to organise money separately than couples in which partners come 
from traditional family backgrounds.  
 
4 The Australian case 
While the international literature on within-couple bank account choices is growing, very 
few studies have focused on Australia. However, Australia stands out as an important 
case study because of its centralized pay setting for most of the 20th century. This is a 
unique policy phenomenon by international standards, which had a remarkable impact 
on women’s financial dependence on their partners/husbands. This state-instituted pay 
setting system consisted of a regulated “family wage” for male jobs, and half the male 
earning rates for women in the same jobs. These practices deterred women’s labour force 
participation and institutionalized a male breadwinner model in which men were 
considered to be the ‘financial leaders’ within their households (Nolan, 2003; 
Whitehouse, 2004). Historically, this has been identified as a major factor obstructing 
women’s financial independence and enhancing men’s sense of entitlement to a higher 
standard of living (Land, 1980; Rathbone, 1947). It has been argued that a legacy of these 
institutional arrangements is the historical, high prevalence of female part-time work in 
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Australia. Women in Australia are more likely to engage in part-time work, particularly 
after becoming mothers, than women in other OECD countries, which entrenches their 
financial dependence on their male partners (Bittman et al., 2003). To the extent that 
these factors have remained embedded in the Australian social ethos, bank account 
arrangements within couples in Australia may exhibit different patterns and dynamics 
than those in other developed countries. For example, there may exist a greater tendency 
towards joint banking due to this historical legacy, and such tendency may be more highly 
associated with couple’s relative income contribution and gender ideology than observed 
in other countries.  
There is only one previous quantitative study on the predictors of bank account choices 
among couples in Australia (Singh and Morley, 2010).1 This explored factors influencing 
individual-level bank account choices using a multinomial logit model estimated on the 
2006 wave of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. 
Key findings from this study indicate that employment status (but not household income) 
is an important predictor of bank account choices. While a pioneer in the Australian 
context, this can be extended in several fronts. The study relies on data which are now 
relatively old, uses the data cross-sectionally, does not exploit the household structure of 
the HILDA Survey, and does not account for many important theoretical factors (e.g. 
gender-role attitudes, transaction costs, parental background, and relationship history). 
We further its findings in these and other ways, as described below. 
 
5 The current study 
We expand upon earlier studies of within-couple bank account choices in several ways. 
First, we provide a more systematic examination of couple’s bank account choices than 
can be found in the available literature. We compare and contrast the predictive power 
on bank account choices of a wider range of factors than those considered by previous 
studies, including economic factors (absolute and relative income, and number of 
dependent children as transaction costs), life-course factors (relationship history and 
duration), and socio-cultural factors (gender-role attitudes). Second, we are the first to 
use longitudinal survey data and panel regression models. This enables us to estimate the 
predictors of couple’s bank account choices more robustly by taking into consideration 
within- and between-couple differences in bank account ownership and its underlying 
                                                          
1 There is however more Australian evidence focusing on financial organization more generally. For 
instance, in descriptive analyses of three datasets, Glezer (1994) found a comparatively high degree of 
resource pooling among dual-earner couples, and no association between such financial arrangements and 
partners’ employment status. These findings were replicated by Foreman and Wilson (1995) using two 
samples of low-income families reliant on social security payments. 
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over-time dynamics. Third, we also innovate by examining bank account choices at the 
couple level using information from both couple members. This is important, as reliance 
on survey responses from just one couple member leads to measurement error (due to 
misreporting of joint bank accounts) and omitted-variable bias (due to the absence of 
partner characteristics in the model). Some studies use respondents’ reports of partners’ 
characteristics, but these are less precise than partners’ self-reports (Heimdal & 
Houseknecht, 2003; Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). Fourth, we 
consider intergenerational effects on within-couple bank account choices. While parental 
background is a theoretically important factor potentially explaining partnered 
individuals’ bank account choices, it has so far been overlooked in the existing literature. 
Finally, we provide the first robust account of couples’ bank account choices in Australia. 
This is important because Australia is an interesting case study due to its institutional 
legacy, and so our study contributes to enriching cross-national comparisons. 
 
6 Data 
Dataset 
Our goal is to model the longitudinal determinants of couples’ bank account choices. To 
accomplish this, we use data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey. The HILDA Survey is a nationally representative panel survey 
initiated in 2001 with 13,969 respondents from 7,682 households. Data were collected 
primarily via face-to-face interviews and self-complete questionnaires with in-scope 
respondents aged 15 years and over residing in private dwellings (Watson & Wooden, 
2002). Since then, interviews have been conducted annually. The HILDA Survey has 
relatively high wave-on-wave response rates ranging from 86.8% in wave two to 96.5% 
in wave 14 (Summerfield et al., 2015).  
This survey is particularly useful for our research purposes for several reasons. First, its 
wealth module collects longitudinal information on participants’ bank account 
ownership in four occasions: wave 2 (2002), wave 6 (2006), wave 10 (2010) and wave 
14 (2014). Few international panel surveys collect such complex information over an 
extended period of time and on an ongoing basis. Second, data on joint bank accounts 
contain personal identifiers of household members, which enables us to determine 
whether a joint bank account is in fact held by both couple members. Third, couple-level 
data enable more precise estimates of the effects of relative income and relationship 
history than individual-level data.  
Information on bank account ownership 
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In the HILDA Survey’s wealth module, respondents are asked whether they have any bank 
accounts in their name only (i.e. separate accounts), and whether they hold any joint bank 
accounts with other people (i.e. joint accounts). For respondents who indicated that they 
hold joint bank accounts, the number of joint accounts and the identity of other household 
members who co-held each of the accounts were asked. These names were coded into 
person identifiers to facilitate matching. We use this information to identify different 
bank account choices at the couple level. Our initial categorization of bank account 
choices draws upon Treas’ (1993) typology, including the following seven mutually 
exclusive categories:2 
(i) Both partners have a joint bank account only. 
(ii) Both partners have separate bank accounts only. 
(iii) The male partner has a separate bank account, while the female partner has no 
bank accounts. 
(iv) The female partner has a separate bank account, while the male partner has no 
bank accounts. 
(v) Both partners have a joint bank account, and the male partner has a separate bank 
account. 
(vi) Both partners have a joint bank account, and the female partner has a separate 
bank account. 
(vii) Both partners have a joint bank account, and both the male and female partners 
have separate bank accounts. 
We use this categorization in a first set of analyses to examine the distribution of couples’ 
bank account choices and how it has changed over time. In subsequent analyses, we 
simplify this categorization to produce results that are theoretically meaningful and 
statistically feasible. First, we construct a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not 
couples have at least one joint account. Second, we construct a four-category variable 
splitting couples as follows:  
(i) Both partners have a joint bank account only (i.e. no separate bank accounts, the 
reference category); 
(ii) The male partner has a separate bank account, while the female partner does not; 
(iii) The female partner has a separate bank account, while the male partner does not; 
and  
(iv) Both the male and female partners have a separate bank account. 
                                                          
2 For 3.79% of couples (n= 1,062) there are mismatches in their reports of joint bank accounts. Most of 
these emerge when one partner reports having a joint bank account, but the other partner does not. In 
these cases, we consider couples as having a joint bank account as long as one partner indicates so.  
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Sample selection 
Since bank account information is only available in HILDA Survey waves 2, 6, 10 and 14, 
our initial sample excludes unpartnered individuals, and comprises 34,854 observations 
from 15,579 partnered individuals who participated in any of these four survey waves 
with valid bank account information. We drop observations from individuals who do not 
cohabit with their partners (n=101 person-year observations), and from respondents 
whose partners did not participate in the survey (n=1,827 person-year observations). For 
respondents who did not have a consistent partner over the observation period, we 
exclude observations from their second and higher-order partnerships (n=635 person-
year observations). We also exclude from our analytical sample same-sex couples, as the 
theoretical reasons leading to different bank account choices are likely to be different for 
these couples (n=314 person-year observations), couples in which the male and female 
partners reported inconsistent marital statuses (n=20 person-year observations), and 
couples in which neither of the partners reported having a bank account (n=80 person-
year observations). Based on data from these matched couples, we derive the couple-
level analytical variables by using information from both couple members, resulting in 
two identical records for each couple (n=31,144). We retain only one of these two 
identical records. Our final analytical sample consists of 15,572 observations from 7,094 
couples. 
Other analytical variables 
Income. For total income, we take the inverse hypobolic sine (IHS) transformation of the 
sum of both partners’ financial-year gross total incomes, after having adjusted these for 
inflation to 2014 prices using annual Consumer Price Index rates. For relative income, we 
follow Kenney’s (2006) approach and create a categorical variable with three categories: 
(i) women contribute 60% or more of the income; (ii) both men and women contribute 
40-60% of the income (equal contribution); and (iii) men contribute 60% or more of the 
income. 
Number of children. We use an available variable within the HILDA Survey capturing the 
number of dependent children in the household. Dependent children are defined as 
persons under 15 years of age, or persons aged 15-24 who are “engaged in full-time study, 
not employed full-time, living with one or both parents, not living with a partner, and who 
does not have a resident child of their own” (Wilkins, 2015: 14).  
Relationship history and duration. The HILDA Survey contains information on the 
number of marriages and de facto relationships (of 3 months or more) participants have 
had. We use this in combination with respondents’ current marital status to separate 
individuals who are in their first marriage/de facto relationship from individuals who are 
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in their second or higher order marriage/de facto relationship. At the couple level, we 
combine this information from both partners into a variable containing four categories: 
(i) both partners are in their first marriage/de facto relationship; (ii) men are in their first 
marriage/de facto relationship and women in their second or higher order marriage/de 
facto relationship; (iii) women are in their first marriage/de facto relationship and men 
in their second or higher order marriage/de facto relationship; and (iv) both partners are 
in their second or higher order marriage/de facto relationship. Relationship durations for 
both marriages and de facto relationships are recorded in years.  
Gender-role attitudes. In its self-completed questionnaires, the HILDA Survey asks about 
respondents’ gender-role attitudes. These questions were included in waves 1, 5, 8 and 
11. We carry forward their responses to waves in which bank details were collected: 
attitudes in wave 1 are brought forward to wave 2, attitudes in wave 5 are brought 
forward to wave 6, attitudes in wave 8 are brought forward to wave 10, and attitudes in 
wave 11 are brought forward to wave 14. We use the degree of respondents’ agreement 
with the following four items to measure respondents’ attitudes towards gender roles: (i) 
“Many working mothers seem to care more about being successful at work than meeting the 
needs of their children”; (ii) “Whatever career a woman may have, her most important role 
in life is still that of being a mother”; (iii) “Mothers who don’t really need the money 
shouldn’t work”; and (iv) “It is better for everyone involved if the man earns the money and 
the woman takes care of the home and children” (Cronbach’s α=0.7). Higher scores 
represent more traditional attitudes, with variables being reverse coded where 
necessary. Scores in each of these items are then summed and rescaled to create an index 
ranging from 0 (most egalitarian attitudes) to 100 (most traditional attitudes). We then 
created a variable measuring the average attitude score of each couple by taking the mean 
of both partners’ scores.  
Family background. Parental occupation and education are used to capture the socio-
economic status (SES) of the family in which respondents grew up. Parental occupational 
status is measured by the Australian Socioeconomic Index 2006 (McMillan, Beavis & 
Jones, 2009), while parental education is recoded into three categories: (i) school year 12 
and below, (ii) professional qualification, and (iii) bachelor degree or higher. We create a 
continuous variable measuring the average status of the family by taking the mean 
occupational status scores of parents. In addition, we derive a dichotomous variable 
identifying whether the respondent comes from a ‘non-traditional family’, i.e. a family in 
which the mother’s educational level is higher than or equal to the father’s educational 
level. We then create a couple-level categorical variable comparing the partners’ family 
background: (i) both partners come from non-traditional families; (ii) only men come 
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from non-traditional families; (iii) only women come from non-traditional families; and 
(iv) neither partner comes from a non-traditional family. 
Control variables. Our multivariate models control for a set of variables which are known 
predictors of within-couple financial organization. Couples in de facto relationships are 
more likely to use separate bank accounts than married couples (Heimdal & 
Houseknecht, 2003; Kan & Laurie, 2014; Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011). Hence, we 
control for marital status in all models except for the model testing the effect of 
relationship history, due to multicollinearity. We also control for couples’ mean age, and 
age differences between partners within a couple. The latter is captured by a 
trichotomous variable: (i) men are at least 5 years older than women; (ii) the age 
difference is within five years; and (iii) women are at least 5 years older than men. This 
is important, as age gaps can be reflective of financial mentality: the larger the age gap, 
the more divergent individual financial perceptions may be, and thus the more likely it is 
that couples organise money separately. Controls for education are added because highly 
educated couples are likely to be more financially liberal than those with low education 
levels, and therefore more likely to choose separate bank accounts. Couple-level 
education is measured through a variable capturing the following scenarios: (i) both 
partners have University degrees; (ii) only the male partner has a University degree; (iii) 
only the female partner has a University degree; and (iv) neither partner has a University 
degree. Dual-earner couples are more likely to have separate bank accounts than other 
couples (Fleming, 1997; Pahl, 1989; Vogler, Brockmann & Wiggins, 2006), and so we 
distinguish between couples in which (i) both partners are employed; (ii) only the male 
partner is employed; (iii) only the female partner is employed; and (iv) neither partner is 
employed. Because there may be cultural differences in financial practices, we also 
control for ethnicity in our models. We use a variable that separates couples into those in 
which (i) both partners were born in Australia; (ii) only the male partner was born in 
Australia; (iii) only the female partner was born in Australia; and (iv) neither partner was 
born in Australia. To test the direct effects of key variables and account for the effect of 
income on financial organization, we control for total income in all models.  
 
7 Methods 
Statistical models 
We extend Treas’s (1993) analyses of bank account choices using panel data and panel 
regression models. Unlike cross-sectional techniques, these models take into 
consideration both within-couple and between-couple differences in bank account 
ownership over time, improving efficiency and reducing bias in their predictions of the 
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longitudinal associations between our factors of interest and couples’ bank account 
choices (Hsiao, 2007). 
First, we estimate a set of random-effect binary logit models that predict whether or not 
couples hold a joint bank account. These models are extensions of cross-sectional binary 
logit models for panel data. Let 𝜂𝑖𝑡  denote the ratio of the probability of having a joint 
bank account (𝜋𝑖𝑡) to the probability of not having a joint bank account for couple 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 denote a 𝑁𝑋 × 1 vector of time-varying variables, 𝒁𝒊 denote a 𝑁𝑍 × 1 vector of 
time-invariant variables, and 𝑁∙ the number of variables in each vector. This gives the 
following random-effect logit model for panel data:  
 
                                                      log(𝜂𝑖𝑡) = log (
𝜋𝑖𝑡
1−𝜋𝑖𝑡
) = 𝜷′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽
′𝒁𝒊     (1) 
 
Second, we estimate a set of random-effect multinomial logit models that distinguish 
between four different types of bank account choices: (i) partners have a joint bank 
account only (the reference category), (ii) only the male partner has a separate bank 
account, (iii) only the female partner has a separate bank account, and (iv) both partners 
have a separate bank account.3 Let ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
 and ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑏) denote the probability of the bank 
account choice falling into the 𝑗th category and the reference category respectively for 
couple 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝜷𝒋 denote the 𝑗th coefficient vector associated with 𝑿𝒊𝒕, and 𝜽𝒋 denote 
the 𝑗th coefficient vector associated with 𝒁𝒊. This gives the following random-effect 
multinomial logit model for panel data:  
 
                                                              log (
?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑏)) = 𝜷𝒋
′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝒋
′𝒁𝒊, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑏   (2) 
 
For ease of interpretation, we express the results of random-effect logit and multinomial 
logit models as odds ratios. 
 
Analytical approach 
We begin with descriptive analyses of the distribution of couples’ bank account choices 
for the pooled sample and its changes over time, followed by bivariate analyses 
                                                          
3 In practice, these are fitted as generalised structural equation models using Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013). 
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comparing the prevalence of different bank account arrangements across categories of 
the independent variables. We then estimate more robust multivariate panel regression 
models that account for observable and unobservable confounders. We first fit a baseline 
multivariate model that includes only the control variables: marital status, age, 
employment status, education, ethnicity, and couple total income. This serves as a 
benchmark for five subsequent models in which we add sets of independent variables of 
interest. In models that test the effect of relationship history and duration, we exclude 
marital status, which is collinear with the more detailed measure added in this model. We 
perform all bivariate and multivariate analyses on both the short (binary) and long 
(multinomial) measures of bank account choices described before. 
 
8 Results  
Descriptive analyses 
Table 1 summarizes the sample prevalence of different bank account arrangements. 
Couples in Australia generally prefer a mixed strategy, with 47% of couples holding both 
joint and separate accounts, compared to 31% having only a joint account, and 22% 
holding only separate accounts. Altogether, about 78% of couples in Australia have a joint 
account. Among those couples with joint bank accounts in which at least one partner also 
has a separate account, women (17% of all couples) are more than twice as likely as men 
(8% of all couples) to have separate accounts. It is however more common for both 
partners within these couples to hold a separate account (23% of all couples). Just in over 
1% of couples in Australia, a partner reports having no bank accounts. 
Figure 1 shows changes in the distribution of couples’ bank account choices over the 
2002-2014 observation window. There have been declines in the proportions of couples 
with (i) a joint account only, and (ii) a joint account and a separate account for one of the 
partners. In contrast, there have been increases in the proportions of couples in which (i) 
both partners hold separate accounts only, and (ii) both partners hold a joint account and 
a separate account. These trends suggest that, as time unfolds, there is increasing 
financial autonomy among individuals within heterosexual couples in Australia, as well 
as greater gender equality in separate bank account ownerships. 
Sample means in the explanatory variables by bank account choices are shown in Table 
2. These show that couples with higher incomes are more likely to have separate accounts 
and less likely to have joint accounts. Partners’ relative resources are also related to 
banking strategies: partners who contribute more income to the household are more 
likely to have a separate account, whereas couples in which both partners contribute 
equally tend to have a joint bank account only. Relative to couples with a joint bank 
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account only, couples with dual separate bank accounts are characterized by fewer 
dependent children, shorter relationship duration, more complex relationship histories, 
more egalitarian gender attitudes, and a higher likelihood of coming from non-traditional 
families. Couples in de facto relationships are more than twice as likely as married 
couples to have dual separate accounts. In contrast, married couples are five times as 
likely as couples in de facto relationships to have only a joint account. Compared to 
couples with separate bank accounts, couples with a joint bank account only have older 
partners with smaller age gaps, lower education levels, and lower employment 
participation, and are more likely to be migrants. 
 
Table 1 Bank account choices of heterosexual couples in Australia 
Bank account choices % 
Partners have only a joint account 30.9 
Partners have only separate accounts 21.9 
  Man has separate account, woman has no accounts            0.6 
  Woman has separate account, man has no accounts           0.7 
  Both have separate accounts            20.6 
Partners have both joint and separate accounts 47.2 
  Joint account + man has a separate account           7.6 
  Joint account + woman has a separate account           16.6 
  Joint account + both partners have a separate account           23.0 
N (observations) 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 
Notes: HILDA Survey data (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Percentages do not add up to 100 due to 
rounding. 
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Figure 1 Over-time change in bank account choices of heterosexual couples in Australia 
 
Notes: HILDA Survey data (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). 
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Table 2 Sample descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations)  
 
Number of  
observations 
All 
couples 
Bank account choices 
 
Only man has 
a separate account 
Only woman has 
a separate account 
Both have 
separate accounts 
Joint account 
only 
Total income (IHS) a 15,572 
11.4 
(0.7) 
11.5 
(0.8) 
11.4 
(0.7) 
11.4 
(0.7) 
11.3 
(0.8) 
Relative income b 15,572      
  Women contribute 60%+  12.7 7.4 19.0 47.9 25.8 
  Similar income contributions  36.7 7.2 15.1 43.5 34.2 
  Men contribute 60%+  50.7 9.0 18.6 42.6 29.8 
Number of dependent children a 15,572 
0.9 
(1.2) 
1.1 
(1.2) 
1.0 
(1.2) 
0.8 
(1.1) 
1.0 
(1.2) 
Relationship duration a 15,450 
19.8 
(16.4) 
19.5 
(15.1) 
23.2 
(15.3) 
14.5 
(15.5) 
25.3 
(16.4) 
Relationship history b 15,570      
  Both 1st relationship  64.4 9.1 19.5 33.1 38.3 
  Men 1st  relationship and women 2nd+   5.5 7.1 20.6 45.1 27.2 
  Women 1st  relationship and men 2nd+   6.2 10.0 16.9 44.5 28.6 
  Both 2nd+ relationship  23.9 5.3 10.8 71.3 12.6 
Gender-role attitudes, mean a 14,243 
54.8 
(14.1) 
55.5 
(14.1) 
55.5 
(13.6) 
52.8 
(14.1) 
56.9 
(14.0) 
Mean parental SES a 15,559 
42.3 
(15.8) 
43.8 
(16.3) 
41.0 
(15.1) 
43.6 
(16.3) 
40.9 
(15.1) 
Non-traditional family background  15,572      
    Both from non-traditional family  35.1 7.8 17.3 43.6 31.4 
    Only man from non-traditional family  15.0 8.5 16.9 44.7 29.8 
    Only woman from non-traditional family  16.7 9.2 18.3 42.8 29.7 
    Neither from non-traditional family  8.7 8.2 16.4 42.1 33.3 
Controls        
Marital status b 15,572      
  Married  81.4 8.9 19.7 35.2 36.3 
  De facto relationship  18.6 5.0 7.0 80.6 7.4 
Mean age a 15,572 
47.5 
(15.6) 
46.5 
(14.2) 
50.1 
(14.1) 
44.0 
(15.9) 
51.3 
(15.3) 
Age difference b 15,572      
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  Man 5+ years older   19.0 8.6 15.1 48.1 28.3 
  Age difference within 5 years  77.9 8.2 18.0 42.0 31.9 
  Woman 5+ years older  3.0 5.5 15.6 57.1 21.8 
Employment status b 15,572      
  Both employed  54.8 8.1 17.6 45.8 28.6 
  Only man employed  19.0 10.9 17.5 42.3 29.3 
  Only woman employed  4.9 7.3 17.4 51.3 24.0 
  Neither employed  21.3 6.1 16.6 37.5 39.9 
Education b 15,572      
  Both have degree  14.5 10.6 15.9 47.1 26.4 
  Only man has degree  10.1 8.9 17.3 43.3 30.5 
  Only woman has degree  12.1 9.4 15.2 45.5 30.0 
  Neither has degree  63.3 7.2 18.1 42.5 32.2 
Ethnicity b 15,572      
  Both born in Australia  65.8 7.6 18.0 44.6 29.9 
  Men born in Australia only  8.9 10.2 16.0 48.2 25.7 
  Women born in Australia only  10.4 8.2 16.6 44.7 30.5 
  Neither born in Australia  14.8 9.5 15.8 35.8 38.8 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Standard deviations in parentheses. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding. The missing 
category of non-traditional family background is omitted for readability.  a statistically significant at the 0.1% level in a one-way analysis of variance. b 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level in a Pearson chi-square test.  
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Multivariate analyses: Baseline models 
We begin by fitting baseline panel regression models which test the effect of the control 
variables on couples’ bank account choices (Table 3). The baseline random-effect logit 
model in column 1 compares couples with joint accounts with couples without joint 
accounts. The odds of having a joint bank account are significantly higher among couples 
who are married (OR=54.44, p<0.001), Australian-born (ORmen=1.99, ORwomen=1.90, 
ORboth=1.67, p<0.01), and older (OR=1.06, p<0.001), and among couples with smaller age 
gaps (ORmen_older=0.41, βwomen_older=0.29, p<0.001) and higher absolute income (OR=1.31, 
p<0.001). Significantly higher odds of having a joint account are also observed among 
dual-earner couples (OR=3.05, p<0.001) and couples in which only the male partner is 
employed (OR=2.40, p<0.001) vis-à-vis jobless couples.4 Compared to couples in which 
neither partner has a university degree, couples in which both partners (OR=1.82, 
p<0.001) or only the male partner (OR=1.41, p<0.1) do so have significantly higher odds 
of holding a joint account. 
The baseline random-effect multinomial logit model further splits couples’ bank account 
choices into four categories, which collectively consider an exhaustive set of 
permutations concerning couples’ separate and joint account ownership (columns 2-4, 
Table 3). This more complex model reveals several interesting patterns which were not 
apparent in the more parsimonious random-effect logit model. Married couples are 
significantly less likely to have separate bank accounts either for one or both partners, 
and so display a greater tendency to rely exclusively on a joint account (ORmen=0.10, 
ORwomen=0.13, p<0.001; ORboth=0.03, p<0.001). The odds of having separate accounts for 
one or both partners also decrease as couples age (ORmen=0.97, p<0.001; ORwomen=0.99, 
p<0.01; ORboth=0.97, p<0.001). If the partner is over 5 years older than the other, he/she 
is more likely to have a separate account (ORmen=1.55, p<0.01, ORwomen=2, p<0.05). Age 
gaps are also related to increased odds of both partners having separate accounts 
(ORmen=1.65, ORwomen=2.80, p<0.001). Employed couples have significantly higher odds 
of holding separate accounts than jobless couples: the male partner is more likely to have 
a separate account when either partner is employed (ORmen=1.69, p<0.01; ORwomen=1.70, 
p<0.05), whereas the female partner is more likely to have a separate account when at 
least one partner is employed (ORmen=1.59, p<0.01; ORwomen=2.19, p<0.001; ORboth=1.67, 
p<0.001). Higher levels of education increase the odds of having a separate account for 
                                                          
4 While the extremely high odds ratio on the marriage variable seems to point towards an issue with the 
data or modelling approach, this is not the case. We discarded that this was due to issues in the variable 
coding, or collinearity with other model variables. Concerning the latter, we checked that the variance 
inflation factors are within acceptable boundaries, and an unusually large odds ratio emerged also in an 
‘empty’ model with no other control variables. In addition, we considered whether the size of the effect 
appeared only in panel models; it did not. Hence, we conclude that this is an actual rather than an artificial 
effect. 
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the male partner (ORmen=1.43, p<0.05; ORwomen=1.34, p<0.1; ORboth=1.88, p<0.001), or 
both partners (ORmen=1.45, p<0.05; ORboth=1.72, p<0.001). The male partner is more 
likely to have a separate account if he was born in Australia (OR=1.83, p<0.01), while the 
female partner (ORmen=1.86, p<0.01; ORwomen Australia=1.46, p<0.1; ORboth Australia=1.55, 
p<0.01) or both partners (ORmen Australia=1.95, p<0.01; ORwomen Australia=1.42, p<0.1; ORboth 
Australia=1.39, p<0.05) are more likely to have separate accounts if at least one couple 
member was born in Australia.  
Across the two baseline models, we find that couples’ employment status, education and 
ethnicity predict their ownership of joint and separate bank accounts in similar 
directions: employed, educated and Australian-born couples are comparatively more 
likely to have both joint accounts (in the random-effect logit model) and some form of 
separate accounts (in the random-effect multinomial logit model). The random-effect 
multinomial logit results reveal reasonably consistent patterns in how the explanatory 
variables relate to the male and female partner having a separate account in addition to 
a joint account, hinting a certain degree of gender egalitarianism in bank account choices 
in the contemporary Australian context. 
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Table 3 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, baseline models 
Variables  
Joint account 
vs. 
no joint account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Marital status (ref. de facto)     
  Legally married 54.44*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.03*** 
Mean couple age 1.06*** 0.97*** 0.99** 0.97*** 
Age difference (ref. <5 years)     
  Man 5+ years older 0.41*** 1.55** 1.23 1.65*** 
  Woman 5+ years older 0.29*** 1.50 2.00* 2.80*** 
Employment status (ref. neither employed)     
  Only man employed  2.40*** 1.69** 1.59** 0.95 
  Only woman employed  1.11 1.70* 2.19*** 1.77** 
  Both employed 3.05*** 1.20 1.67*** 0.96 
Education (ref. neither have degree)     
  Only man has degree 1.41+ 1.43* 1.16 1.45* 
  Only woman has degree 1.26 1.34+ 0.94 1.14 
  Both has degree 1.82*** 1.88*** 1.27 1.72*** 
Ethnicity (ref. neither born in Australia)     
  Only man born in Australia 1.99** 1.83** 1.86** 1.95** 
  Only woman born in Australia 1.90** 1.15 1.46+ 1.42+ 
  Both born in Australia 1.67** 1.07 1.55** 1.39* 
Total couple income (IHS) 1.31*** 1.19** 1.08 1.08 
N (observations) 15,572 15,572 15,572 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios. Column 1 displays the results of the random-effect binary logit model (with robust 
standard errors), and columns 2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial logit model (with robust standard errors). + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Multivariate analyses: Hypothesis testing 
In Table 4 we present the results of a final series of panel regression models aimed at 
testing our 5 sets of research hypotheses. These add selected variables to the baseline 
models discussed before. The first set of models tests the effect of absolute and relative 
income on couples’ bank account choices. In the random-effect logit model absolute 
income increases the odds of couples choosing a joint account (OR=1.3, p<0.001). 
However, results from the random-effect multinomial logit model reveal that it actually 
raises the relative probability that couples have some combination involving separate 
accounts. These seemingly contradictory results resonate with findings from Treas 
(1993): while partially pooling their resources, high-income couples also maintain a 
certain extent of financial autonomy to ensure freedom in personal spending. This is not 
evident in the simpler binary logit model, as joint accounts are often accompanied by 
separate accounts. Consistent with our relative resources hypothesis, we find that 
couples in which the female partner contributes more income to the household have 
significantly lower odds of having a joint account than couples in which both partners 
make similar income contributions (OR=0.67, p<0.05). The random-effect multinomial 
logit model results further reveal that greater income contributions to the household by 
the female partner increase the chances that couples have any bank account arrangement 
involving separate accounts, suggesting that women’s income contribution is more 
predictive of separate banking than men’s.  
The second set of models tests the effect of the number of dependent children in the 
household on couples’ bank account choices. In the random-effect logit model, additional 
children are associated with increased odds of having a joint account (OR=1.33, p<0.001). 
In the random-effect multinomial logit model, children reduce the odds of having 
separate accounts for either or both partners (ORmen=0.86, p<0.001; ORwomen=0.92, 
p<0.05; ORboth=0.77, p<0.001). These findings are consistent with our second hypothesis, 
and suggests that couples pool resources to achieve optimal utility in the presence of 
increased transaction costs. 
Results from the third set of models indicate that, as predicted in our hypotheses, 
relationship history and duration are strong predictors of bank account choices. In the 
random-effect logit model, remarried/re-partnered couples have much lower odds of 
having joint accounts than couples in their first marriages/de facto relationships 
(ORmen=0.23, ORwomen=0.33, ORboth=0.05, p<0.001). In the random-effect multinomial 
logit model, we further learn that remarriage/re-partnership raises the odds of having 
separate accounts for either or both partners. In a similar vein, relationship duration is 
positively associated with the odds of having a joint account in the random-effect logit 
model (OR=1.07, p<0.001), and negatively associated with the odds of all arrangements 
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involving separate accounts in the random-effect multinomial logit model (ORmen=0.97, 
ORwomen=0.97, ORboth=0.95, p<0.001). 
The fourth set of models considers the predictive power of gender ideology on bank 
account choices. Traditional gender attitudes are not associated with the odds of couples 
having joint accounts in the random-effect logit model. However, results in the more 
complex random-effect multinomial logit model indicate that such attitudes are 
associated with reduced odds for having separate accounts for the female partner 
(OR=0.99, p<0.1) or both partners (OR=0.99, p<0.001). This is consistent with our fourth 
hypothesis. 
The final set of models yields evidence of substantial intergenerational impacts on 
couples’ bank account choices. As predicted in our last hypothesis, in the random-effect 
logit model, couples in which both partners come from non-traditional family 
backgrounds have much lower odds of having joint accounts (OR=0.57, p<0.05). The 
random-effect multinomial logit model yields additional insights: parental socio-
economic status is positively associated with the odds of both partners having separate 
bank accounts (OR=1.01, p<0.1), with women’s family background being more predictive 
of separate account choices than men’s. That is, separate bank accounts are more 
prevalent among couples in which only one partner comes from a non-traditional family 
when such partner is the woman (ORmen=1.52, p<0.1; ORwomen=1.51, p<0.05; ORboth=1.42, 
p<0.1). 
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Table 4 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, hypothesis testing 
Hypotheses  
Joint account 
vs. no joint 
account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Hypothesis 1     
Total income (IHS) 1.30*** 1.19** 1.08 1.09+ 
Relative resources (ref. similar contribution)     
  Women contribute 60%+ 0.67** 1.32+ 1.64*** 1.51*** 
  Men contribute 60%+ 1.01 1.14 1.27** 1.06 
Control variables a Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 15,572 15,572 15,572 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 
Hypothesis 2     
Number of dependent children 1.33*** 0.86*** 0.92* 0.77*** 
Control variables b Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 15,572 15,572 15,572 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 
Hypothesis 3     
Relationship history (ref. both 1st relationship)     
  Men 1st relationship and women 2nd+ 0.23*** 1.55+ 2.07*** 2.12*** 
  Women 1st relationship and men 2nd+ 0.33*** 1.80* 1.69* 1.96*** 
  Both 2nd+ relationship 0.05*** 5.50*** 5.90*** 14.57*** 
Relationship duration 1.07*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 
Control variables c Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 15,449 15,449 15,449 15,449 
N (individuals) 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 
Hypothesis 4     
Gender-role attitudes 1.00 1.00 0.99+ 0.99*** 
Control variables b Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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N (observations) 14,243 14,243 14,243 14,243 
N (individuals) 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 
Hypothesis 5     
Mean parental SES  1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01+ 
Family background (ref. neither from non-traditional family)     
    Only man from non-traditional family 0.70 1.33 1.29 1.34 
    Only woman from non-traditional family 0.83 1.52+ 1.51* 1.42+ 
    Both from non-traditional family 0.57* 1.29 1.36 1.40+ 
Control variables b Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 15,559 15,559 15,559 15,559 
N (individuals) 7,084 7,084 7,084 7,084 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios. Column 1 displays the results of the random-effect binary logit models, and columns 
2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial logit models. All models feature robust standard errors. The coefficient of the missing category 
in non-traditional family background is omitted for readability. a marital status, age, employment, education and ethnicity. b marital status, age, 
employment, education, ethnicity and total income (IHS). c age, employment, education, ethnicity and total income (IHS). + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
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9 Discussion and conclusion 
Summary of aims, contributions and key findings 
In this paper we have systematically examined the trends in and predictors of bank 
account choices among heterosexual couples in contemporary Australia. By paying 
attention to economic, life-course, and socio-cultural explanations, and taking into 
consideration intergenerational factors, we provided a more encompassing and granular 
picture of within-couple bank account choices than ever before. Our empirical analyses 
were undertaken using a large, nationally representative household panel survey 
comprising the period 2002-2014, exploiting both its panel structure (by estimating 
state-of-the-art panel regression models for the first time in this field) and its household 
structure (by leveraging couple-level data that better reflects partnership circumstances 
and improves estimation). 
We find that heterosexual couples in contemporary Australia tend to favor mixed banking 
strategies which combine joint and separate bank accounts. The most prevalent scenario 
is the exclusive use of a joint bank account, but alternative ‘separate but equal’ models 
are on the rise. These involve both the male and female partners holding separate 
accounts in addition or instead of a joint account. In addition to confirming that couple’s 
bank account choices in the contemporary Australian context are reflective of partners’ 
socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. age, marital status, employment status, 
education, and ethnicity), we find new evidence that such choices are also contingent on 
other economic, life-course, socio-cultural and intergenerational factors. Altogether, we 
found robust evidence supporting Hypotheses 1 to 3 (relative resources, children as 
transaction costs, relationship duration and history), and some evidence in support of 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 (gender ideology, intergenerational effects). 
Economic factors were found to be important predictors of couples’ bank account 
choices. Both absolute and relative income affected these in theoretically expected ways: 
high absolute income was associated with increased odds of joint account ownership, 
whereas comparable income contributions to the household by couple members were 
associated with arrangements involving separate accounts. This pattern of results 
concerning spousal bargaining power is consistent with findings from other literatures 
examining couple-level outcomes (e.g. employment and housework). Interestingly, 
women’s contribution of total income was more predictive of separate bank accounts 
than men’s contribution. We take this finding as evidence that women’s economic 
resources are important drivers of financial independence. Our results were also 
consistent with the hypothesis that the number of children in the household would lead 
to increased odds of having joint bank accounts and decreased odds of having 
arrangements involving separate accounts. We take this finding as suggestive evidence of 
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the notion of ‘transaction costs’. That is, couples opt for a joint banking strategy that 
minimizes negotiations and disputes on the source of payments associated with their 
collective capitals. 
Life-course factors were also important precursors of couples’ banking arrangements. 
Particularly, shorter and more complicated relationship histories were associated with 
couples more often relying on separate accounts. This finding highlights the importance 
of considering bank account choices within a life-course perspective.  
In addition, socio-cultural aspects, measured through individual attitudes, were also 
predictive of bank account choices in theoretically meaningful ways. In this respect, we 
provide evidence that traditional gender-role attitudes are negatively related to the odds 
of couple members using separate banking. This constitutes novel evidence that attitudes 
are important drivers of individuals’ bank account choices net of material/tangible 
factors, and of couples ‘doing gender’ when making banking decisions. This finding adds 
to a body of knowledge documenting the effects of gender-role attitudes on individuals’ 
behaviors across life domains, e.g. labor, childcare and housework supply, union 
formation and dissolution, leisure time allocations, or marital conflict –see Davis & 
Greenstein (2009) for a review.  
Finally, we provided first-time evidence of intergenerational effects on bank account 
choices –prior research focused predominantly on concurrent individual and couple 
factors. High parental socio-economic status and ‘non-traditional’ family background 
(concerning gender equality) were both associated with an increased prevalence of 
separate banking arrangements. Altogether, the intergenerational effects found were 
more pronounced for women, suggesting that certain family backgrounds may promote 
the transgression of gendered scripts. 
Implications for theory, policy and practice 
Our results speak of similarities and differences in the prevalence and predictors of 
different bank account arrangements between Australia and other countries. Unlike 
countries in which exclusive use of joint accounts (e.g. the US) or separate accounts (e.g. 
the UK and South Korea) is the norm, Australia is distinctive for the prevalence of mixed 
banking strategies which combine joint and separate accounts. Similar to studies in the 
US, the UK and Norway, we find that egalitarian contributions to household income, 
dependent children and longer relationships are all positively associated with joint 
account ownership and negatively associated with separate accounts. However, our 
finding of a negative effect of traditional gender ideology on couples’ ownership of 
separate bank accounts in Australia is at odds with findings for other countries. In the US, 
Heimdal & Houseknecht (2003) found no such effect. This could reflect Australia’s unique 
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historical legacy: institutional inertia due to previous legislation reinforcing the male-
breadwinner model may still influence the behaviors and outcomes of couples in 
contemporary Australia. More broadly, our study has added Australia as a comparison 
benchmark to existing evidence for the US, the UK, Canada, Norway and South Korea. 
Pooling the results from our study and these other studies, we now have a relatively good 
understanding of the micro-level factors associated with different bank account 
arrangements within couples, e.g. age, education, number of children, and marital status. 
Yet, we have virtually no evidence on the role of macro-level factors in influencing 
couples’ bank account arrangements. One set of such macro-level factors may operate 
through country contexts, as hinted by documented country-level differences in the 
prevalence of joint bank accounts across studies –with the United States (very prevalent) 
and South Korea (virtually inexistent) as two extremes. Hence, a promising research 
avenue within this field of enquiry would be to systematically examine the country-level 
factors associated with bank account choices. From other literature looking at contextual 
moderators of gender inequality (e.g. pertaining to the division of domestic labor, see 
Geist & Cohen, 2011), we suspect that such factors may encompass welfare regimes, 
average levels of female economic activity, normative gender ideologies, or family tax 
policies (see also Prince-Cooke & Baxter, 2010). A move in this direction would however 
require the availability of a harmonized cross-national dataset containing the requisite 
information. 
Concerning gender theory, our findings confirm that aspects known to produce gendered 
behaviors and outcomes in other domains (e.g. domestic divisions of labor) also produce 
gendered behaviors and outcomes in relation to couples’ bank account choices. These 
include economic factors (absolute income, relative resources), cultural factors (gender 
ideology), and life-course factors (relationship history and duration). Hence, taken 
together, our results indicate that examining the precursors of bank account choices 
constitutes a novel and insightful way to further probe into the gendering of every-day 
family life. Thus, our findings have implications for gender equality in financial 
arrangements within Australian couples, and the financial emancipation of partnered 
women. High female income contributions to household resources and egalitarian 
ideologies of co-provision both translate into more ‘democratic’ bank account 
arrangements. If empowering women in intimate relationships through more equal 
banking strategies is a desirable goal, social policies and interventions which promote the 
emergence of gender egalitarian attitudes and improve the financial position of women 
are likely to have such an effect. Mothers’ education was also an important precursor of 
adult children’s bank account choices, being associated with banking arrangements that 
provide their adult daughters with increased financial autonomy. Hence, current trends 
in female educational attainment may indirectly result in societal changes in the 
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prevalence of more gender-egalitarian bank account arrangements. More broadly, we 
find that factors such as parental socio-economic status are related to couple members’ 
separate banking behaviors. Given ongoing socio-demographic trends in these factors, 
our findings suggest that bank account choices will become progressively more 
egalitarian and individualized over the life course, across generations and over time. 
Limitations and further research 
Despite our several contributions to the scant international literature on bank account 
choices, our study suffers from some limitations which must be acknowledged. First, our 
operationalization of certain explanatory variables is hampered by data quality. 
Particularly, our gender-attitude measure is not concurrent and neglects the fact that 
such attitudes can change (Baxter et al., 2015), and our parental background variables 
are retrospectively reported by adult children, which may lead to measurement error 
(Huang, Perales & Western, 2016). Additionally, we lacked information on parents’ bank 
account choices, financial arrangements, and gender ideology, all of which would have 
added depth to our intergenerational analyses. Second, we only consider the types of 
bank account arrangements, but do not delve into other potentially important factors. 
These may include the number of accounts, how much money people have in each 
account, the source of money deposited in joint accounts, and the spending behavior of 
the different owners of joint accounts. It is likely that having joint accounts does not 
translate into egalitarian control over the money deposited in such accounts (Edwards, 
1981; Glezer, 1994), as perceptions of money ownership and patterns of expenditure may 
be associated with who brings money in (Nyman, 2003). Future research studies should 
consider these factors as a means to gain better insights into within-couple everyday 
financial arrangements. In particular, there is room for more qualitative research 
examining whether and how gender ideology and family background relate to individual- 
and couple-level decision making concerning bank account ownership. Third, while we 
now know a lot about the precursors of bank account choices, we still have a very limited 
understanding about the potential consequences of these choices. Pioneer research 
suggests that couples who make spending decisions separately are comparatively less 
satisfied with family life (Vogler, Lyonette & Wiggins, 2008), while whether or not 
couples have joint accounts makes no significant difference to partners’ psychological 
wellbeing (Kan & Laurie, 2014). Future studies should expand the analysis of bank 
account choices by considering their potential consequences on other (inter)personal 
outcomes, including relationship quality and satisfaction, happiness, life satisfaction, 
financial stress, and perceptions of money control. Such studies, however, will face 
important methodological challenges, particularly concerning their ability to identify the 
direction of causal arrows (Nyman, 2003).  
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Concluding remarks 
To conclude, this study has focused on an important and often overlooked aspect of 
within-couple financial arrangements: bank account choices. As we have argued and 
demonstrated throughout this article, bank account choices are complex and 
multifaceted, and provide an additional window into how everyday-life family decisions 
are enacted, and are sometimes rooted within gendered discourses. More research on 
financial autonomy among couple members is needed, as this has important implications 
on women’s financial emancipation. 
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